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 Some Thoughts on the Transitional 
Justice Dilemmas 
in the Romanian Post-Communist Context1 
 
ALEXANDRU GUSSI 
 
 
 
The Romanian case confirms Ruti Teitel's observation that, in relation with 
transitional justice, “the truth is a story of eternal return”2. The official December 
2006 condemnation of the communist regime coincided with Romania's accession 
to the European Union. Both events have influenced the way in which Romania was 
analyzed after 2007, especially from the perspective of its relationship with the 
communist past. If we were to make a quick summary, the dominant perception is that of 
going from a country with a belated democratic transition, dominated by the former 
communists, therefore characterized by the wish to forget the totalitarian past, to a 
country that normalizes in relation to the evolution of most other former communist 
bloc states.3 
Hence the subsequent idea of having an official memory produced as a 
consequence of the condemnation of the communist regime by the head of the state. 
However, that the Romanian state was to be far from consistent in imposing such a 
memory. Beyond the issue of customization and the lack of coordination between 
the institutions created in the 2000s to deal with the past, Polichinelle's secret 
emerged, the issue of their politicization. The phenomenon in itself underlines the 
importance of relationships between political parties and the sensitive issue of 
transitional justice4. 
                                                        
1
  This paper was supported by UEFISCDI under the grant PN-II-RU-PD-2012-3-0399, 
Contract no. 42/29 Apr 2013, “Conflicting Memories within Romanian State Institutions. 
The Impact on the Democratization Process”. 
2
  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2000, p. 90. 
3
  For example in 2007 Georges Mink was assimilating Romania to Central European 
countries in terms of the degree of the removal of communism, see “Europe et ses passés 
douloureux: Strategies historicisantes et usages de l'Europe”, in Georges Mink, Laure 
Neumayer, L’Europe et ses passés douloureux, La Decouverte, Paris, 2007, pp. 11-35/p. 28. 
For the Romanian context of the last few years and the political crisis after the accession 
to the EU see Ronald F. Kind, Paul E. Sum (eds.), Romania Under Băsescu: Aspirations, 
Achievements, and Frustrations During His First Presidential Term, Rowan&Littlefield, 
Lanham, MD, 2011. 
4
  For the importance of the cleavage on dealing with the communist past in post-communist 
political regimes see Daniel-Louis Seiler, “Peut-on appliquer les clivages de Rokkan à 
l’Europe centrale ?”, in Jean-Michel De Waele, Partis politiques et démocratie en Europe 
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The period after the condemnation is interesting for the change produced in 
relationships among militants for transitional justice. As we shall show below, they 
identify themselves as anti-communists, and in the 1990s we usually find them in or 
around the Democratic Convention. Their apparent unity was already hiding a 
profound difference between civic and political anti-communists5. The 
disappearance of the Democratic Convention in 2000 lessened the appearance of 
unity, but it was only after 2007 that we see that a profound rift became visible 
within the anti-communist world. In this paper we shall attempt to show the reasons 
and the reshuffling of cards in this area, as the new premises laying the foundation 
of the discussion on the communist past, as well as that on the political role of the 
transitional justice in today's Romania.  
 
 
THE RELATION TO THE COMMUNIST PAST  
IN THE POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIAN CONTEXT 
 
Even though the discussion on Romanian exceptionalism is of no interest to us 
here, it is clear that the first step in moving away from the Ceaușescu’s regime was 
by no means banal. Erin Poly and Jeremy Sarkin, in their Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies, note that: “The summary trials and prompt execution of Romania's 
leaders Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife were notable exceptions to the modern 
trend favoring legal responses to political wrongdoing”6. Analyzing the Romanian 
case cannot fail to start every time from this paradox of the symbolic, revolutionary 
form of the change in regime, doubled by a reality of the continuity of the State, of 
the political, military and economic elite. It is no wonder, thus, that, as Lavinia Stan 
noted in 2013 in a more general analysis of Romania's relationship with its 
communist past: “The country has adopted a wide diversity of transitional justice 
methods, but almost none of these methods have been brought to completion”7, 
while for Ed. Maxfield, in the Romanian chapter of the Encyclopedia of 
Transitional Justice, the emphasis is on the fact that “each step has been met with 
                                                                                                                                       
centrale et orientale, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2002, pp. 115-144. 
5
  For the distinction between civic and political anti-communism see Alexandru Gussi, La 
Roumanie face à son passé communiste. Mémoires et cultures politiques, l’Harmattan, 
Paris, 2011, pp. 201-2012. 
6
  Erin Poly, Jeremy Sarkin, Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Finding common Ground, 
University of Pennsilvania Press, Philadelphia, 2007, p. 23. 
7
  Lavinia Stan, “Reckoning with the Communist Past in Romania: a Scorecard”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 65, no. 1, 2013, pp. 127-146/p. 143. 
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political resistance” in transitional justice because “the former elite stayed in power 
for so long after 1989”8.  
It is no secret, therefore, that this resistance comes from the inheritors of 
the Party-State found all throughout the institutions of the post-communist regime, 
as well as political parties. In the same vein, we have Vladimir Tismăneanu's 
observations on the essential continuity elements in the political culture found at the 
level of State institutions9. 
If we were to summarize the evolution of these institutions, we should start 
from the fact that former communist Ion Iliescu was the head of the Romanian State 
between December 1989 and December 1996. In these first 7 years of transition 
(December 1989-December 1997), the State was not rebuilt in the logic of his new 
democratic legitimacy. In the post-communist regimes where the successor parties 
were not defeated in elections in 1989 or 1990, as was the case in Romania, and 
some other ex-Soviet states, these heirs of the former communist parties were able 
to maintain a form of control over state structures which never really passes for a 
process of decomunization10. 
The post-communist state under Iliescu's leadership tried to adapt to the 
democratic transition in order to avoid more significant changes. In this line of 
logic, a very partial memory of the communist regime was institutionalized, which 
was in fact a policy of oblivion, reaffirmed between 2001 and 2004. After 1997 and 
after 2005, public statements were made by the new parties in power against this 
institutionalized reality. However, there is no continuity in political will with regard 
to this matter.  
Even though generally the emphasis falls on the limitations of transitional 
justice in Romania, the question emerges logically: How come there is such a wide 
diversity of transitional justice methods? Shall we read this in the same way in 
which we could interpret today the excessive violence right after December 22 
1989, including the Ceausescu executions, as an attempt to effectively cover a real 
continuity with a symbolic break with the past? 
One element of the answer can be found in the cyclical precipice between 
the expectations created in revolutionary or nearly revolutionary terms and the 
critical analysis of the results: the 1989 moment, the moment of the first alternation 
                                                        
8
  Ed. Maxfield, “Romania”, in Lavinia Stan, Nadya Nedelsky (eds.), Encyclopedia of Transitional 
Justice, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 398- 403/p. 398. 
9
  Vladimir Tismăneanu, Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. 
10
  For the Romanian case see Alexandru Gussi, “Political Uses of Memory and the State in Post-
Communism”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2013, 
pp. 721-732. 
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in December 2006, the moment of the condemnation of communism in December 
2006. It seems that for almost 25 years now, a part of Romanian society judges the 
changes based on the yardstick of the myth of revolution, a myth reaffirmed after 
1989, whose political effectiveness has proven indomitable, a myth that can also be 
interpreted as part of a longer history.  
After December 2006 it was to be expected to have a reaction from the 
institutions of the State in terms of official discourse11. In fact the entire state 
institutional system does not answer to the presidential discourse on the communist 
past. If before 2004 we could talk about a bunker state opposed to transitional 
justice, the steps taken after 2006 have emphasized even more the existence of 
institutional resistance, preserving the inertia instituted by Ion Iliescu's oblivion 
policy in the first seven years of transition. However, institutional resistance alone 
cannot explain this situation12. Below, we shall attempt to touch on two other issues 
that are just as important: the level of political will, and especially that lack of 
strength of anti-communist groups in civil society. Beyond the political speeches, 
which are forms of political use of the past, the Romanian case is one of lack of 
balance between political, institutional, economic and media power shared by those 
with ties to the former regime, and those who make transitional justice demands.  
This imbalance seemed able to be righted around 2006, especially as 
communism was officially condemned. However, the result of this persistent 
imbalance can be seen by the absence of symbolic elements which have been for 
the long time on the agenda of militants of memory: a museum of communism in 
Bucharest13 and a monument for the victims of communism. Hence, much of the 
frustration experienced by the anti-communists 9 years away from the official 
condemnation of communism14. Thus, the 2006 condemnation made even more 
                                                        
11
  For example or the inability to implement measures concerning transitional criminal 
justice see Raluca Grosescu, Raluca Ursachi, Justiţia penală de tranziţie. De la Nurnberg 
la postcomunismul românesc, Polirom, Iaşi, 2009. 
12
  For the bureaucratic continuity and the political elite continuity after 1989 see Raluca 
Grosescu, “Fizionomia nomenclaturii”, in Anuarul Institutului de Investigare a Crimelor 
Comunismului, vol. I, 2006, pp. 109-140. 
13
  The general director of the IICCR, Stejărel Olaru, announced that this was a priority of 
the Institute right when it was created, see Stejărel Olaru, “Despre Institutul de Investigare 
a Crimelor Comunismului din România”, De ce trebuie condamnat comunismul. Anuarul 
IICCR, vol. I, 2006, pp. 9-12, pp. 11-12. In 2011, several statements from the leadership 
of the IICCMR announced the same thing, and the party in power, the Liberal Democratic 
Party, in theory endorsed this project.  
14
  Public statements, but also statements made personally to the author by important figures 
in the anti-communist civil society, such as the head of the AFDPR Octavian Bjoza, head 
of the Civic Academy, Ana Blandiana, or the president of the 21 December Association, T. 
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visible a resistance towards transitional justice, which was greater than in most other 
socialist countries who had joined the EU15.  
The essential change produced here is that this resistance is no longer expressed 
towards demands made by civil society, which is much too divided in any case, but 
even towards those institutions of the state which have to put into practice the 
policies of memory16. To this end is to emphasize the marginal role to which are 
relegated the institutions in charge of managing the past, such as the IICMER, the 
CNSAS (the commission analyzing the Securitate archives), and the NA (National 
Archives). At the same time, this marginalization paradoxically emphasizes the 
relative autonomy which these institutions enjoy in managing memory.  
 
 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND  
THE ROMANIAN ANTI-COMMUNISTS 
 
The politicization of the relationship to the past, and implicitly of these 
pressures, cannot be separated from their effectiveness, because the political parties 
are the ones making these decisions. It is only natural that they would then attempt 
to gain legitimacy through these policies. In fact, as Geoffrey Pridham points out, in 
a democratic transition “parties are important as agents for transmission, but also 
transmogrification of historical memories”17. 
If we look at the polls, we could ask ourselves if politicians may have 
overestimated anti-communism's ability to mobilize18. However, beyond the recent 
                                                                                                                                       
Mărieş. 
15
  For this comparative dimension of transitional justice see Lavinia Stan (ed.), Transitional 
Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist 
Past, Routledge, New York, 2009. 
16
  It is interesting to note in this case that the absence of the museum could confirm the 
criticism regarding the concrete consequences of the official condemnation of 
communism; public critics of this project have argued against it precisely because “it 
could provide continuity to the anti-communist ideology of the Final Report” (“ar fi în 
continuitatea ideologiei anticomuniste din Raportul Final”); see Igor Mocanu, “Muzeul 
Comunismului-de la investigare la reenactment porno”, in Criticatac. Antologie I (2010-
2011), Cartier, Chișinău, 2011, pp. 250-255/p. 253 for the quote. See also Măriuca 
Morariu, “From Condemnation to Melancholy. Alternative Meanings of Post- Communist 
Nostalgia in Romania Beyond the Official Anti-Communist Discourse”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. XII, no. 2, pp. 289-308/pp. 302-305.  
17
  Geoffrey Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratization. A Comparative Approach, 
Continuum, London and NewYork, 2000, p. 35. 
18
  See for example CSOP-IICMER 2010, 2011 and 2012 polls at 
http://www.iiccr.ro/ro/sondaje _iiccmer_csop/ (accessed on 15 September 2013).  
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evolution of events, the relationship with the communist past is still an important 
element of identity, both at the level of civic groups and of political parties19.  
At the same time, the identity field changed much in the 1990s. At that point 
we saw a true blending of militants for transitional justice, including representatives 
of the victims, and the politicians who claim an anti-communist identity. Militants 
for transitional justice defined themselves through a more or less politicized anti-
communism, but diverse from a doctrine point of view, with a common point in the 
attempt to base democracy on the condemnation of the communist regime. The 
narrative of the past was thus seen as a premise of a European future20. After the 
political change in 1996, made by the anti-communist Democratic Convention, 
came a collective disappointment and reduced importance for a discourse critical 
towards the communist regime. The report of the presidential Commission for the 
Analysis of the Communist Regime in Romania, issued in 2006, came as a form of 
revenge and of fulfillment of the anti-communism of those first post-communist years. 
 
 
Anti-communism and Democratization 
 
Anti-communism was built in Romania as a common ideology of those who 
stood against the National Salvation Front and its claimed entitlement to the 
inheritance of the revolutionary moment of 1989, using it as a means of restoring 
legitimacy to a part of the former elite of the communist state. Any critical look at 
Romania's past cannot be separated from the context in which the revolutionary 
form of the regime change in December 1989 had the apparently paradoxical 
consequence of restoring political legitimacy to a large portion of the cadres of the 
Party-State as it was before 1989.  
The historical (pre-WWII) parties, which formed the core of the Democratic 
Convention, hold a special place in the debate on the past, because these parties 
                                                        
19
  For the importance of public intellectuals, especially anti-communists, in influencing the 
public debate, but also the political agenda in the first post-communist decade, and for the 
democratic dimension of anti-communist public intellectuals, see Cosmina Tănăsoiu, 
“Intellectuals and Post-communist Politics in Romania: An Analysis of Public Discourse, 
1990-2000”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, pp. 80-113. For 
Vladimir Tismăneanu “Critical intellectuals may insist on the need for moral clarity, but 
the political class remains narcissistically self-centered and impervious to the injunction to 
live in truth”, Vladimir Tismăneanu, “Leninist Legacies, Pluralist Dilemmas”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 18, no. 4, October 2007, pp. 34-39/p. 35. 
20
  The 1990 Timișoara Proclamation or University Square are significant for this movement, 
which became institutionalized in the Civic Alliance, and formed the core ideological 
basis of the Democratic Convention. 
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were the bearers not only of the memory of communism and victims of its 
dictatorship, but of that of dictatorships before it. In this way, they have a 
democratic legitimacy which they imprint on the mainstream anti-communist 
discourse, uncontaminated by the other type of anti-communist discourse, the 
extreme-right one.  
The first seven years of transition, those before the changeover in 1996, are 
the years when the aims of transitional justice were promoted almost exclusively by 
the opponents of state power. At the same time, Romania's president, Ion Iliescu, 
and his government quite often expressed themselves and acted against those aims.  
However, there are two categories of actors that utilize the anti-communist 
discourse. The first is that of political parties, members in the Democratic 
Convention, mainly the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party 
(PNȚCD and PNL). For them, the anti-communist discourse is part of their party 
identity, presented as martyrs of the communist regime. Their doctrines, Christian 
Democracy and Liberalism, were unconvincing, and their anti-communist 
dimension prevailed.  
The second category of actors is that of civic militants. Their discourse, 
however, is confused with that of the first category, before 2007, because for the 
supporters of transitional justice, the aim of removing from power Ion Iliescu and 
his party, seen as neo-communists, was a condition necessary for achieving their 
aims. So for 7 years the discourse on transitional justice was the preferred weapon 
for the opposition against a power which is still seen undifferentiated from state 
institutions, the latter becoming a sort of bunker to defend against condemning the 
guilty, the restitution of property, moral rehabilitation, and reparations to be paid to 
the victims of communism.  
The fact that the discourse about the past and the political discourse of the 
opposition are initially impossible to dissociate is important for the understanding 
of the difficulties faced by opposition anti-communism in trying to become official. 
We will not dwell here on drawing a bottom line for the period when the anti-
communist opposition was in power (1996-2000), we will simply make the 
observation that it was beyond disappointing for the supporters of transitional 
justice. In fact, the civic dimension of anti-communism would become critical 
against the political dimension, which would contribute decisively to the 
disappearance of the DC in 2000. For an implicit self-analysis of that bottom line, 
we will simply quote former president Emil Constantinescu, who, in 2004, less than 
four years away from ending his term, said: “Romania is in danger. The state is a 
hostage of the Securitate-communist mafia” and that what was needed was a 
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“national war of liberation from the domination of Securitate-communist mafia”21. 
Even though critical of president Băsescu, Constantinescu took part in the 
Parliament session of 18 December 2006, but the general consensus was that no one 
understood why he himself had not promoted, as an anti-communist president, this 
type of condemnation against the communist past.  
Civic anti-communism survived precisely because it had come into 
opposition to the DC before it vanished. After 2001 the militants of transitional 
justice seem to be free of the confusion made between their specific aims and 
partisan objectives. Not for long, though.  
 
 
The De-Politicization and Re-Politicization 
of the Discourse on the Communist Past 
 
Ion Iliescu's return to power after the November-December 2000 
parliamentary and presidential elections was a step back in transitional justice. The 
directly proportional relationship between the progress of transitional justice and 
democratization was well illustrated by that period. For Steven Levitsky and Lucan 
A. Way “Under Iliescu (2000-2004), Romania fell back into competitive 
authoritarianism”22. It is also the reason for which in 2004, in spite of the fact that 
anti-communism had disappeared as a relevant political identity, its themes are 
essential in the political opposition's critical discourse. In fact, a sort of orange 
election revolution would occur in November-December 2004 in the name of this 
discourse.  
We see now, in Romania's case, how inaction in transitional justice has a 
significant political cost. In spite of the fact that Ion Iliescu took a much more 
prudent attitude towards the past between 2001 and 2004, state institutions still 
stonewalled when it came to access to Securitate archives, as well as to those of the 
Romanian Communist Part and the Union of Communist Youth23, a fact speculated 
by the opposition. During the same period, it sees that the civic anti-communism, 
the kind not hijacked by political parties, seems to no longer be effective. This 
                                                        
21
  Emil Constantinescu, Adevărul despre România (1989-2004), Ediţie pilot, Universalia, 
București, 2004, p. 525 and 526. 
22
  Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the 
Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 103. 
23
  In this regard of the opening of the archives see for example Alina Pavelescu, 
“Reconcilierea posttotalitară cu trecutul pe tărâmul istoriei publice-relația între arhiviști și 
istorici în România”, in Sergiu Mustață, Igor Casu (eds.), Fără termen de prescripție. 
Aspecte ale investigării comunismului în Europa, Cartier, Chișinău, 2011, pp. 190-200. 
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conjunction of factors resulted in anti-communism being forgotten in politics, and 
being rediscovered only in the 2004 election year. That happened because the 
parties that had abandoned anti-communism could not find other sources of identity.  
Here we notice that the cycle politicization, de-politicization and then re-
politicization of anti-communist discourse emerges as a blending of nine structural 
factors defining the relationship with the communist past in Romanian politics: a 
dominant party which inherited the State-Party, which systematically opposes the 
aims of transitional justice; a relationship of this party with state structures, based 
on complicity against the aims of anti-anti-communism; a State marred by a 
problem if illegitimacy originating in the murky December 1989 moment, and 
especially the early period of democratization, marred by missing the constitutional 
moment; the preservation of the rift on the communist past after December 2006 
through the wish of the SDP to not accept the condemnation of communism, and 
through the fact that Ion Iliescu returns as an honorary leader of the SDP right in 
December 200624; a fragmented political opposition, without a clear political 
identity, which uses anti-communism as an identity substitute, and a natural weapon 
against the dominant party; a civil society poor in resources, which could only 
mobilize society with the help of resources coming directly from political parties, or 
indirectly through the State; an anti-communist part of civil society which is on one 
hand critical of the State and parties, and on the other losing credibility after the 
repeated use of the past as a political instrument; a feckless court system after 1989, 
complicit in the politicized treatment of the revolution or of the events in June 1990 
or September 1991.  
At the same time, in this context, it is important to quote James Mark who 
talked about a museification of communism in several states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, including Romania. He points out “an ideology of the continued struggle 
against an enemy that had survived and refused to be defeated”25. This ideology is 
characterized by a museification of communism promoted by anti-communists, thus 
reconciliation is far from being the priority of this type of museal and discoursive 
undertaking26. This observation is important also for the issue of politicization: to 
the extent that this type of “ideology”, of trend, dominates the anti-communist 
discourse, it gains importance for political parties, either in an attempt to hijack it, 
or to allow them to identify themselves by opposition to the anti-communists.  
                                                        
24
  The Social Democratic Party contested the condemnation moment, see the Resolution of 
the Extraordinary Congress of the SDP with regard to using the past as a political 
weapon, 10 December 2006, www.psd.ro (accessed on 12 December 2012). 
25
  James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution. Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-
Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2010, p. 92. 
26
  Ibidem. 
ALEXANDRU GUSSI 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XV  no. 2  2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 
After the type of anti-communism represented by the National Peasant 
Party and President Emil Constantinescu, disappeared post-2000, the opposition 
ignored this issue that had been essential in establishing a line of non-alliance, non-
negotiation with Ion Iliescu's party. The latter, in fact, changed its name in 2001, 
when it joined several smaller parties, among them one historical party, the Social 
Democratic Party of Romania, and adopts is current moniker, the Social Democratic 
Party. This party, if not reformed, at least underwent a process of re-branding under 
Adrian Năstase, who signed support protocols with the Democratic Union of Ethnic 
Hungarians in Romania (2001-2004), and even the National Liberal Party (2001-
2004). The ruling SDP and the opposition parties took similar positions on NATO 
and EU integration. The most significant moment of this collaboration was that of 
the revision of the Constitution in 2003, which could only have been possible by 
consensus.  
We notice an obvious ideological convergence of the main political forces 
in Parliament: the Social Democratic Party, the National Liberal Party, and the 
Democratic Party. This convergence came to be confirmed by the evolution after 
2004 and the creation of Social-Liberal Union (USL). The only place where this 
convergence doesn't seem to occur is in the discourse on the independence of justice 
and the fight against corruption as part of the continuation of the process of 
democratization27. In this context, the problem of relating to the communist past as 
an element of differentiation between SDP and non-SPD parties reappeared, an 
element the more important as there was a danger that the entire political spectrum 
was gaining an image of uniformity.  
Ideological differentiation includes the memory of the rift on the 
communist past in the 1990s, even if its role is still secondary. Falling within the 
logic of focusing on the impunity of the political class in terms of corruption is the 
alliance created against the SDP: the Alliance for Justice and Truth (National 
Liberal – Democratic Party). This name recalls that which had been the core of the 
anti-communist discourse in the DCR up until 1996. Justice and Truth blend into a 
single message the issues faced by transitional justice, as well as those faced by the 
judiciary in facing the post-communist political class.  
The role of this critical discourse of the communist past, though secondary, 
is that of granting credibility to the Alliance for Justice and Truth in continuing the 
efforts made by the former Democratic Convention in differentiating themselves 
                                                        
27
  Cynthia Horne analyzes the link between lustration and the fight against corruption in 
both Romania and Poland, both in relation to the institutional credibility of the State see 
Cynthia Horne, “Late Lustration Programmes in Romania and Poland: Supporting or 
Undermining Democratic Transitions?”, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 2, April 2009, 
pp. 344-376.  
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from a Party and State seen as dominated by the former communists.  
After 2004, in view of its role in that electoral moment, a significant part of 
civil society28 put firmly on the public agenda the idea of transitional justice29. This 
pressure may not have been too strong in society overall, but it took on much more 
significance when it came to the anti-SDP voters. However, it may not have had the 
very important effect we have seen in 2006 lacking a specific political context.  
Between 2005-2006, tensions mounted between ruling coalition partners of 
the Alliance for Justice and Truth, and most of all between the prime minister and 
the president. At that point, the discourse on the past, implicit in the objectives of 
transitional justice as well, became an important factor of legitimacy. That is even 
more important as there was a conflict between the National Liberals and the 
Democratic Party, the latter joining in 2005 the Popular Party, threatening the 
position of the Liberals, which for a while had been the only party claiming the 
center right among parliamentary parties.  
During this new stage, anti-communism became once again an important 
political resource, this time not in the struggle, already traditional, with the SDP, Ion 
Iliescu's party, but as a first in the internal struggle from the anti-SDP area, between 
the former partners in the Alliance for Justice and Truth, the National Liberals and 
the Democratic Party.  
As a consequence of this new type of political face-off, two phenomena 
emerged, redrawing the list of issues in the discourse on Romania's communist past:  
1. For the first time, a crack appears between the visible supporters of 
civic anti-communism. At least at first there seemed not to be two kinds 
of anti-communism, but the symbolic resources of civic anti-
communism are used in a form of struggle which, among transitional 
justice supporters, was fratricide; 
2. There emerged what we could call Type 2 political anti-communism. Its 
main characteristic is that the political anti-communism of 1990 was 
pointed against Ion Iliescu's party, and had legitimacy issuing from the 
presence of former political prisoners in the leadership of parties that 
formed the Democratic Convention. They lent significant credibility to 
                                                        
28
  Especially the coalition of NGOs “Coaliția pentru un Parlament Curat” (the Alliance for a 
Clean Parliament). 
29
  The most influential was the public statement was “Apelul pentru condamnarea 
comunismului” proposed by a GSD member, Sorin Ilieșiu, and signed by aticommunist 
associations, March 2006, see http://www.memoria.ro/marturii/perioade_istorice/ 
inceputul_comunismului/recunoasterea,_asumarea_si_condamnarea_genocidului_comuni
st_/1657/, (accessed on 15 September 2013). 
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this type of discourse, which thus did not have adversaries in civil 
society, supporting the acceleration of the process of democratization. 
Practically, none of these characteristics is valid any longer as part of 
the new face of political anti-communism, which we could refer to as 
post-post-communist. It was visible not only in the fight between the 
National Liberals and the (Liberal) Democratic Party, but became a 
common good, adopted even by the SDP30. After an initial stage of 
inflation, this type of discourse lost value and was marginalized after 2009. 
Paradoxically, the political framework defined by these two new realities 
made possible the most important steps forward made by transitional justice after 
1989: the creation of the IICCR, the creation of the Commission for the Analysis of 
the Communist Dictatorship in Romania, the official condemnation of the 
communist regime, the opening of the Communist Party Central Committee 
archives, and placing the Securitate archives under the custody of the CNSAS. This 
acceleration started in 2006 was so much dependent on the political circumstances 
that we will not be able to see in the upcoming years a comparable emulation in 
terms of the relationship with the communist past.  
 
 
THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONTEXT AND 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OFFICIAL CONDEMNATION 
OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME AND THE EXPLOSION 
OF THE ANTICOMMUNIST GALAXY 
 
Even though it occurred before integration, the condemnation of communism 
was not a requirement from European institutions31. We could say that, compared to 
the official admission of Romania's involvement in the Holocaust, which was 
largely the result of external pressure, here it was basically an exclusively domestic 
process. As shown above, even before the president officially condemned 
communism in December 2006, there were already camps that would later 
crystallize more visibly and would stand more clearly for or against the importance 
                                                        
30
  See an example from a Societatea Timișoara 2014 statement: http://www.revistapresei 
.eu/stire/constatare-publica-psd-confisca-simbolurile-rezistentei-anticomuniste.html, (accessed 
on 29 December 2014). 
31
  On this issue see John Gledhill, “Integrating the Past: Regional Integration and Historical 
Reckoning in Central and Eastern Europe”, Nationalities Papers, vol. 39, no. 4, July 
2011, pp. 481-506 and Raluca Grosescu, Raluca Ursachi, Justiţia penală de 
tranziţie…cit., pp. 68-106. 
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of that presidential gesture. The political stake of these stances was whether or not 
one provided President Băsescu with usable political capital.  
People who wrote on the consequences of this condemnation have generally 
downplayed the idea of a very significant effect on collective memory32. We have 
shown above that, from the point of view of a non-politicized memory, this official 
condemnation comes at an unfortunate moment. It is first and foremost an 
achievement of all anti-communist groups, a result of a pressure originating in the 
rift of the 1990s. There is, therefore, an issue of historical timing. It not only comes 
very late, it comes at the end of a political cycle. After 2007, enough signs could be 
seen that a new political cycle was coming, but also a new form of Romanian 
transition or adaptation to its new status of European Union member.  
The second wave of anti-communism, which drives the continuation of 
transitional justice processes, is much more the result of a critique of the present, 
rather than the past, it is the result of a collective frustration which sees the 
communist elite as the main beneficiary of Romanian post-communism33. In this 
context, the official condemnation of communism, a major aim of the first anti-
communist wave, becomes secondary for the second wave.  
Add to this another off beat step: in the same period of time, but especially 
after the economic and social crisis that swept Romania starting in early 2008, one 
could see a resurgence in a tendency to see in a positive light the communist past34. 
                                                        
32
  See for example Monica Ciobanu, “Criminalising the Past and Reconstructing Collective 
Memory: The Romanian Truth Commission”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 61, no. 2, March 
2009, pp. 313-336; Lavinia Stan, Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Romania, 
Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge, 2013; James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution. 
Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 2010; Florin Leontin Abraham, Provocări epistemologice ale 
totalitarismului. O metodologie a studiului regimurilor comuniste, Editura Muzeului 
Național al Literaturii Române, București, 2013; Cristian Tileagă, “Communism in 
Retrospect: The Rhetoric of Historical Representation and Writing the Collective Memory 
of Recent Past”, Memories Studies, no. 5 (4), 2012, pp. 462-478.  
33
  C. Horne's more general observation is particularly relevant for the Romanian case: 
Lustration is resonating with a symbolic and institutional sense that something about the 
democratic transitions is incomplete”, Cynthia Horne, “Late Lustration Programmes in 
Romania and Poland…cit.”.  
34
  For the entire area there was a new wave of decommunization at a time when nostalgia 
was on the rise, but that also had to do with a generational phenomenon, a correlation 
generally valid for the East, but mostly Romania, see Joakim Ekman, Jonas Linde, 
“Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, September 
2005, pp. 354-374. For the Romanian case Cristian Tileagă links the limited influence of 
the Tismăneanu Report “for a national narrative around coming to terms with the past” to 
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Chronologically speaking, the presidential discourse of December 2006 comes ahead 
of the time when the nostalgia became evident, and it seems intended to answer to it 
first and foremost, not to the long wait of the anti-communists. After 2007, we can see 
only partially a form of post-transitional justice in the sense of “a reintroduction of 
the politics of the past onto the political agenda and/ or the political sphere with the 
intention of changing the dominant narrative of the past”, because the demands for 
condemnation started from the observation that there was no “dominant narrative of 
the past”35. However, the idea of a totally new stage, of a new cycle of transitional 
justice is useful for understanding a phenomenon observed in other post-transitional 
states: “What is at stake in this new stage of dealing with the past is not only the 
legacies of the previous regime, but also the legacies of the transition”36. 
The Tismăneanu Commission's report is the climax of the “trial of 
communism”, started in Romania in 1990 by the intellectual and civic elite, 
supported by anti-communist NGOs. The report is also a condemnation of post-
communist civil society against the communist regime.  
If we were to summarize the discussion around the Commission-Report-
Speech sequence, it starts from the fact that it was written by a presidential 
commission, but its character of official institutional product is challenged. It was, 
however, embraced by the Traian Băsescu administration, if only for being posted 
on its official website37. However, the people who wrote it were given the 
intellectual freedom of doing as they wished, which allowed the president to include 
in his speech only a part of the main recommendations of the report. The speech is 
doubtless an official one, however the fact that Parliament did not endorse it robs it 
of strength. The fact that the president condemned communism could be seen as 
political and/or personal, which for his critics raises questions on whether or not the 
Romanian State really condemned the communist regime38.  
                                                                                                                                       
a public opinion gauged in polls that show a tendency to see in a better light the period 
before 1989, see Cristian Tileagă, “Communism in Retrospect…cit.”, p. 465.  
35
  Filipa Raimundo, „Dealing with the Past in Central and Southern European Democracies: 
Comparing Spain and Poland”, in Georges Mink, Laure Neumayer, History, Memory and 
Politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Memory Games, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 
2013, pp. 136-154/p. 138. 
36
  Ibidem. 
37
  The English official translation of the 18 December 2006 presidential speech, 
http://cpcadcr.presidency.ro/upload/8288_en.pdf (accesed on 20 May 2014). 
38
 For example see the observations of Monica Ciobanu, “Criminalising the Past and 
Reconstructing Collective Memory: The Romanian Truth Commission”, Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 61, no. 2, March 2009, pp. 313-336/p. 323 and Florin Leontin Abraham, Provocări 
epistemologice ale totalitarismului. O metodologie a studiului regimurilor comuniste, 
Editura Muzeului Național al Literaturii Române Bucharest, 2013, pp. 177-186. 
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In 2005, when there were already repeated calls for declaring the communist 
regime “illegitimate and criminal”, the division pro and against the head of State 
started in the anti-communist faction. The announcement that the Commission was 
forming came too late, because from the point of view of a part of the 1990s anti-
communists, the Commission was already seen as politically customized. Since this 
feeling was not too widespread, some of the head of State's critics accepted to be on 
the Commission, but while it was running its activity, especially in 2007, their position 
would become radicalized in criticizing the political use of the 2006 speech39. 
In fact, as Georges Mink observed, there is a sort of conflict of interest 
within political anti-communism, since the aim of its supporters is “faire durer aussi 
longtemps que possible le gisement memoriel en état d'exploitation, car la 
production du dissensus mémoriel garantit à ces acteurs un positionement 
avantageux sur la scène partisane”40. This observation could be extended to the 
Romanian civic anti-communism.  
It is necessary to seek the political reasons for the rift between civic anti-
communists, because this division does not occur on the natural line between 
“radicals” and “moderates”. Even though the apparently most “radical”, such as 
IICCR head Marius Oprea, or the head of the AFDPR (Association of Former 
Political Prisoners in Romania), Octavian Bjoza, were critical of the president, the 
presidential commission report is as “radical” as they come. In fact, it is criticized 
for having the features of anti-communist radicalism, having three of the most 
important characteristics it took in post-communist Romania. The first is using the 
notion of genocide, the second is avoiding self blame, “communism as other”, by 
the fact that the communist regime is “distanced from the (national) self”. The third 
is the observation that the Tismăneanu Report touches on the period after 1989 as 
well, blaming the state for street violence in 1990, which reinforces the idea of ”the 
continuing struggle against communism”41. 
In fact, in the hottest moments of internecine conflicts within the ranks of the 
anti-communists, such as the ones in 2010 when the head of the IICCR (which had 
been renamed IICMER), Marius Oprea, was replaced, and the leadership that 
followed was contested from within in the IICMER, the conflicts do not crystallize 
                                                        
39
  For example Marius Oprea, the first director of the Institute for the Investigation of the 
Communist Crimes in Romania (2007-2009), member of Tismăneanu Comission, but a 
critic of the December 2006 presidential speech. 
40
  Georges Mink, “Europe et ses passés douloureux: Strategies historicisantes et usages de 
l'Europe”, in Georges Mink, Laure Neumayer, L’Europe et ses passés douloureux, La 
Decouverte, Paris, 2007, pp. 11-35/p. 29. 
41
  James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution. Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-
Eastern Europe, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2010. 
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around the different visions on the communist past.  
To the extent that the report is, as we have shown, up to the standards of the 
Romanian anti-communists, even those we may consider “radical”, and to the 
extent that the presidential speech adopted the main theses of the report, the 
discussion seems to be focused on the consequences. A part of the critics of the 
official condemnation of communism focused on the consequences which are 
considered practically null publicly, while the supporters of this undertaking 
rejected this criticism, while avoiding to denounce the attitude of the state, which 
obviously had not internalized the condemnation speech.  
In 2013, Lavinia Stan observed that “The challenge facing the pro-transitional 
justice civil society groups is that of finding a common ground, a common drive 
and a common platform”42. In the Romanian case the explosion of the 
anticommunist galaxy is the result of political conflicts. At the same time, the issue 
of politicization remains a structural dilemma. As the three dimensions without 
transitional justice could not exist (the pressure from interested parties in civil 
society, the political will, and the state-institutional dimension), nothing would be 
possible without the last two, both presupposing a level of politicization. The 
political use of the past remains not a risk, but an unavoidable cost accepted by the 
militants of memory. It is the reason for which, as we have shown, in Romania there 
could emerge unavoidable, systemic rifts between various anti-communist groups, 
rifts which at first sight are not only political, but are at the same time related to 
differing strategies of imposing the aims of transitional justice.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we tried to emphasize the most important features of the 
political context in which the issue of the communist past is raised in 2006. We 
showed the extent to which the politicization of the anti-communist discourse 
results from some structural factors, which we have enumerated, which define the 
relationship with the communist past of the actual Romanian political system. 
We have also described the political context preparing the December 2006 
moment, emphasizing that it could not be later emulated, and that emulation was 
improbable because of the lack of balance of force between anticommunists and 
their adversaries.  
                                                        
42
  Lavinia Stan, „Civil Society and Post-communist Transitional Justice in Romania”, in O. 
Simic, Z. Volcic (eds.), Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans, Springer 
Science, New York, 2013, pp. 17-31/p. 29. 
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To conclude, the second wave of anti-communism is the result of a political 
context, but also a social one with a collective frustration which sees the 
nomenklatura as the main beneficiary of post-communism.  
The Romanian case is one of lack of balance in political, economic, 
institutional and media power, to the dismay of the militants for transitional justice. 
This tipping of the scales existed in 1990, and was not overcome in the 2006 
moment, which at a more general level enhanced the lack of confidence in the state 
and the political factor. However, the 1990 bunker-state working against the 
condemnation of communism was partially dismantled after 2005-2006, but in parallel, 
as a side effect, the anti-bunker-state front also broke down. This explosion of the anti-
communist galaxy led to a remarkable diminution of the influence of the 
transitional justice supporters in the political sphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
